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In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court curbed Congress’s ability to limit 
campaign finance in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n.1 The Citizens 
United decision immediately set off a debate over the underlying principle 
of the decision; namely, can money become a corrupting force in politics 
during a political campaign?2 Justice Kennedy’s opinion rejected the notion 
that campaign donations were potential sources of corruption in most cases. 
Writing for the majority, the court held that not only did “few if any contri-
butions to candidates . . . involve quid pro quo arrangements,”3 but that “in-
dependent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give 
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”4 
Justice Stevens, in a lengthy dissent, painted a different picture, argu-
ing “[t]he Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected insti-
tutions across the nation.”5 He goes on to argue, “[t]he legislative and judi-
cial proceedings relating to BCRA generated a substantial body of evidence 
suggesting that, as corporations grew more and more adept at crafting ‘issue 
ads’ to help or harm a particular candidate, these nominally independent 
expenditures began to corrupt the political process in a very direct sense. 
The sponsors of these ads were routinely granted special access after the 
campaign was over.”6 
Just a year earlier, Justice Kennedy had taken a different view when 
examining the potential of outside advertising in judicial races. In Caperton 
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 1. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 2. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citi-
zens United, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 2365, 2367 (2010). 
 3. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–58. 
 4. Id. at 357. 
 5. Id. at 396. 
 6. Id. at 454–55. 
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v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,7 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in a 
5-4 decision, which held a plaintiff’s due process rights were violated under 
the 14th Amendment when a state supreme court justice failed to recuse 
himself in an appeal where he received more than $3 million in campaign 
donations from the chief executive officer (CEO) of the defendant corpora-
tion in the matter.8 In fact, evidence pointed to the CEO raising money for 
the judicial candidate with the knowledge that the judge would eventually 
hear an appeal on this case.9 
Justice Kennedy found, based on two prior Court decisions, the respon-
sibility of judges to recuse themselves went beyond the traditional common 
law standard of a judge having a direct financial interest in a party.10 Instead, 
he wrote, citing Withrow v. Larkin,11 that recusal was necessary when “the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too 
high to be constitutionally tolerable.”12 
In Caperton, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s petition for recusal on 
four different occasions; the plaintiff argued he did not have to step down 
from the case absent objective evidence of bias.13 Justice Kennedy rejected 
this argument, holding that “there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on 
objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake 
in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in plac-
ing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election 
campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”14 
Justice Kennedy noted the $3 million donation to the judge by the de-
fendant’s CEO was more than all of the judge’s other donations combined, 
and that the timing of the donations reflected an effort to influence the very 
case for which the recusal was sought.15 The Court found that while judges 
would not always have to recuse themselves when they received campaign 
contributions from parties to a suit, in this case, the “extreme facts” meant 
that there was a “probability of actual bias,” which rose “to an unconstitu-
tional level.”16 
It should be noted that Justice Kennedy took pains to describe the facts 
in Caperton as “an extraordinary situation where the Constitution requires 
recusal.”17 Nevertheless, he accepted the proposition that a presumption of a 
 
 7. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 8. Id. at 873–74. 
 9. Id. at 873. 
 10. Id. at 877–79. 
 11. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975). 
 12. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 877(quoting Winthrop v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 13. Id. at 882. 
 14. Id. at 884. 
 15. Id. at 884–85. 
 16. Id. at 886–87. 
 17. Id. at 887. 
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likelihood of bias could be created by campaign contributions to a judge 
from a party to a lawsuit.18 
In this paper, we continue to explore the relationship between outside 
groups and judicial candidates, a relationship we argue should not be taken 
lightly. In two earlier articles,19 the authors examined non-candidate issue 
advertisements on Milwaukee radio stations to empirically examine whether 
any changes in the employment of the advertisements or the ads themselves 
were visible during the times of the changes in campaign finance law 
brought about by the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 (BCRA) and the Citizens United decision. We found close correlations 
between the changes in the law and the number of entities buying issue ad-
vertisements, the amount of money spent, and the number of candidate men-
tions made in the advertisements.20 In a third article, we expanded our analy-
sis to include issue advertising during judicial elections in Wisconsin.21 Us-
ing our previous research as a starting point, here we examine the judicial 
advertising during elections in the spring of 2016 in two states, Wisconsin 
and Arkansas. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s requirement for quid 
pro quo corruption to limit independent political spending, and Part III 
summarizes the state of political advertising and the law. We lay out our 
research questions and method in Part IV, as we look for potential influence 
on judicial elections in Arkansas and Wisconsin, and we lay out the results 
of our inquiry in Part V. Part VI discusses the meaning of the results, while 
we sum up the findings and offer thoughts on how to move forward in Part 
VII. 
II. RECUSAL AND QUID PRO QUO CORRUPTION 
Past research has shown that there is a demonstrable correlation be-
tween donations to justices in Wisconsin and favorable rulings in favor of 
campaign supporters in more than 50 percent of cases.
 22 Additionally, an 
 
 18. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884. 
 19. Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, Citizens United, Issue Ads, and Radio: An 
Empirical Analysis, 20 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 307 (2012) [hereinafter Empirical Analysis]; 
Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, Milwaukee Radio Public File Data, 1998-2011: An 
Empirical Analysis of Issue Advertising After the BCRA and Citizens United, 24(1) U. OF 
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157 (2013) [hereinafter Milwaukee Radio]. 
 20. Milwaukee Radio, supra note 19. 
 21. Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, An Opening for Quid Pro Quo Corruption? 
An Empirical Analysis of Issue Advertising in Wisconsin Judicial Races Before and After 
Citizens United, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305 (2015). 
 22. Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices Tend to Favor Attorney Donors (Oct. 20, 2013), 
http://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2013/10/20/wisconsin-supreme-court-justices-tend-to-favor-
attorney-donors/ (“[i]n instances where a contribution came in before a case was decided, 
justices favored those attorneys’ clients 59 percent of the time.”). 
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analysis of the Wisconsin State Supreme Court revealed that the justices 
failed to recuse themselves in at least 98 percent of cases in which one or 
more of the participants have donated to one or more of the justices’ election 
campaigns.23
 
As a result, an empirical examination of issue advertisements 
in races for judges, where the potential for something approaching Justice 
Kennedy’s quid pro quo benchmark for corruption is great, provides an im-
portant opportunity for a focused, empirical inquiry.
 
In the matter of judicial elections, to empirically examine the effect of 
issue advertising, we need to examine the third-party spending—freed by 
the decisions in Citizens United (dealing with the content of issue advertis-
ing) and McCutcheon v. FEC (which dealt with spending limits).24 Issue 
advertising made up the bulk of campaign spending in Wisconsin judicial 
races during our initial period of study.25 While the relationship between 
outside groups and candidates for political office is subject to some debate, 
the potential for outside groups to influence an election in favor of a friendly 
judicial candidate increases the potential for corruption substantially, which 
Justice Kennedy recognized in Caperton.26 
So far, the Supreme Court majority has limited the government interest 
in regulating campaign contributions to the narrow area of “quid pro quo 
arrangements.”27 That is, unless a donor receives an agreed-upon benefit in 
exchange for a contribution, the donation cannot rise to the level of being a 
corruptive influence sufficient to justify congressional regulation of the free 
speech rights of a corporation, union, or other entity providing campaign 
money.28 For the current Supreme Court to uphold any limitation on cam-
paign finance, the government will need to be able to demonstrate that the 
law in question limits quid pro quo corruption. General influence of the type 
Justice Stevens was concerned with in his Citizens United dissent will not 
suffice. 
Our previous Wisconsin-based research demonstrated that prior to Citi-
zens United, the only non-candidate political ads mentioning a judicial can-
didate at any level between 1998 and 2009 were a series of spots run in 2006 
encouraging people to support the confirmation of Justice Samuel Alito’s 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens United 
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 25. Terry & Bard, supra note 14. 
 26. See supra note 14. 
 27. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355. 
 28. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. 
Rev. 1425, 1455 (2015). Stephanopoulos argues that with the Supreme Court limiting the 
government’s interest in preventing corruption to quid pro quo arrangements, campaign fi-
nance reform legislation will need to rely on government interests beyond preventing corrup-
tion. He proposes the interest in ensuring that public policy aligns with the wishes of the 
electorate. 
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nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court.29 Given the completeness of the ar-
chive we were working from, we interpreted this as indication that issue 
advertising in judicial elections was limited.30 While the archive contained 
entries for candidate advertising in several local and state-level judicial elec-
tions, the public file data suggests that issue groups had only become in-
volved in judicial elections after the changes to the electioneering communi-
cation standards in the Citizens United decision.31 The removal by Citizens 
United of the limits as to when issue ads could mention candidates appears 
to have played a substantial role in introducing third-party advertisements to 
judicial races. 
While issue advertising in judicial races in Wisconsin was limited prior 
to Citizens United, our previous research supports the conclusion that the 
decision had a powerful effect on advertising in judicial races in Wisconsin, 
opening the door for third-party groups to make significant investments in 
ads attacking one candidate and/or supporting another.32 The quantity of 
issue advertising exploded in the 2011 Wisconsin supreme court race in the 
first full year after Citizens United after more than a decade of no issue ads 
being run in judicial elections in Wisconsin.33 Without the changes in the 
law brought about by the decision, many of the issue ads (including all of 
the judicial ads, which identified the candidates within thirty days of a pri-
mary or sixty days of a general election) run in 2011 would not have been 
permissible under federal law and/or the station’s policies.34 Just two years 
later, in 2013, during the next statewide judicial race, there was more adver-
tising by outside groups than by both of the candidates combined.35 As such, 
the media debate (which, clearly, looms large in shaping the overall debate 
in a race) in the judicial election was not primarily set by the candidates, but 
was in the hands of outside groups. 
The environment for potential quid pro quo corruption in this arrange-
ment became a reality during a series of the legal challenges to the John Doe 
investigation of illegal campaign coordination during Governor Scott Walk-
er’s recall election.36 Outside groups implicated in the investigation had 
 
 29. See Milwaukee Radio, supra note 19. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Terry & Bard, supra note 13. A check of the data we had for other in-market stations 
in our study of issue advertising changes between 2006 and 2010 also supports the finding 
that outside groups were not purchasing issue ads for judicial elections prior to Citizens Unit-
ed. 
 32. See Milwaukee Radio, supra note 19. 
 33. See Terry & Bard, supra note 21. 
 34. See Empirical Analysis, supra note 19. 
 35. Terry & Bard, supra note 21. 
 36. Although the legal wrangling around the John Doe investigation of Wisconsin Gov-
ernor Scott Walker was largely secret and sealed, a leak of key documents was reported on by 
The Guardian, including requests for at least two of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Judges to 
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spent significant amounts of money on issue advertising during both politi-
cal and judicial elections in Wisconsin before becoming parties to a lawsuit 
that ultimately halted the investigation of their allegedly illegal campaign 
activities.37 
III. POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND THE LAW 
Political advertising in broadcasting is divided into two major catego-
ries. Campaign advertising, advertising that originates with the official cam-
paign of a legally qualified candidate, is governed by rules contained within 
sections 312/315 of the Communications Act of 1934.38 Provisions within 
the Act require broadcasters to carry campaign advertisements from candi-
dates for federal office, provide equal opportunity to advertising by oppos-
ing candidates upon request, and to offer advertisement availability to a 
candidate at the lowest unit rate.39 
The second category of political advertising, non-candidate political 
advertising (often referred to simply as “issue ads”), covers any other adver-
tising that discusses a political issue. Non-candidate political advertising 
does not originate from the official campaign of a candidate for office. In-
stead, the advertising comes from outside parties such as individuals, un-
ions, corporations, or even political parties. One of the provisions of the 
BCRA that was invalidated by Citizens United is the limits on “electioneer-
ing communications,”40 a standard which prevented issue ads from identify-
ing candidates in commercials within thirty days of a primary contest or 
sixty days of a general election.41 In regulatory terms, issue ads are not given 
the same protections under federal law as campaign advertisements. Stations 
are not required to sell or air issue ads, and because a station can choose 
which, if any, issue ads it will run, the station assumes legal responsibility 
for the content of the ads that it airs.42 
 
recuse themselves because of their relationships with parties being investigated in the case. 
Ed Pilkington, Because Scott Walker Asked, GUARDIAN (Sept.14, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2016/sep/14/john-doe-files-scott-
walker-corporate-cash-american-politics; see also Dee J. Hall, Justices Face Questions as 
‘John Doe’ Probe Lands in Supreme Court, WIS. ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://host.madison.
com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/justices-face-questions-as-john-doe-probe-lands-in-
supreme/article_b082257c-3b2d-5ac9-b7ee-63bc64286beb.html. 
 37. Grant of Petition for Review, Three Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, No. 
013AP2504-2508-W (Wis. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2017), http://media.jrn.com/documents/2013AP
2504and2014AP296and2014AP417.pdf. 
 38. 47 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. (2012). 
 39. Id. § 315(2)(b). 
 40. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2012) (originally enacted as Communications Act of 1934, 
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012). 
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Assuming a broadcast radio or television station is willing to sell issue 
advertising, it will typically make a decision to carry issue ads at a pre-
specified rate, and will then publish a rate card that identifies the prices for 
issue advertising sales. This information will be available, along with a list 
of advertisers buying issue ads, within a station’s public file.43 Radio and 
television broadcasters are required by law to maintain political advertising 
information in their public files for a period of two years.44 As public file 
data on political advertising includes pricing information, typically stations 
will remove material periodically to keep information in line with the two-
year requirement and to remove proprietary information on advertising 
rates.45 Even though the data within a station’s public file is relatively easy 
to access,46 these databases can be challenging to navigate without some 
broadcast industry knowledge and/or previous experience with them. Pro-
fessor Terry is a former radio producer with significant experience in han-
dling station public files, having been in charge of regulatory compliance 
duties during his professional career. Our previous research was developed 
using a unique archive of public file data from a cluster of radio stations 
based in Milwaukee, WI, that we were able to access through professional 
connections.47 
For this research, we follow the lines of our earlier research, expanding 
our attention to contemporary public file data on the non-candidate political 
advertising as it relates to judicial races and candidates that ran on local tel-
evision stations in Arkansas and Wisconsin ahead of the statewide Spring 
elections in 2016. The use of public file data presents a complete picture of 
the spending and running of political advertising; therefore, it is possible to 
directly examine the spending of the candidates and outside groups in judi-
cial elections. 
IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD 
The majority’s holding in Citizens United made assumptions about the 
effects of corporate money (on corruption, influence and advertising) with-
out considering empirical evidence. The Court then chose not to hear argu-
ments in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock,48 instead issuing a 
per curiam decision reversing a Montana supreme court decision upholding 
 
 43. Id. § 315(e). 
 44. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3527(e)(5) (2017). 
 45. 47 U.S.C. § 315(e)(3). 
 46. See Public Inspection Files, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/ 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2017). For television stations, a database of each station’s public file is 
now online and available through the FCC’s website. 
 47. See supra note 19. 
 48. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516 (2012) (per curiam). 
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the state’s campaign finance statute, citing the Citizens United decision.49 
The arguments in American Tradition Partnership would have included 
historical and empirical data on the effects of corporate political spending in 
that state.50 
We renew our premise that empirical data provides the best opportunity 
to assess the decision in Citizens United without political or ideological bias. 
We continue to argue that to ignore the available empirical evidence is a 
mistake, no matter where the data takes the argument. Past research has 
demonstrated a correlation between direct contributions to justices and fa-
vorable rulings.51 Spending on behalf of (friendly) judicial candidates, espe-
cially in lower—turnout spring elections, like the statewide judicial races in 
Arkansas and Wisconsin, has the potential to have more influence on a voter 
than similar spending in larger political campaigns. With an incentive to 
“stack the bench,” for example, industry groups opposed to environmental 
or workplace regulations can support anti-regulation candidates, potentially 
spending unlimited amounts of money to advertise on their behalf; far more 
than any judicial candidate would spend individually. With a demonstrable 
history of state supreme court justices unwilling to recuse themselves from 
cases on ethical grounds,52 corporations, lobbies, and other groups that know 
pending legislation, legal liabilities, or regulations will end up under judicial 
review could view spending money on issue advertising as a practical, effec-
tive investment in influencing the candidate to rule in their favor. This prem-
ise was recognized by Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Caperton. 
For this paper, we are interested in developing data that compared the 
campaign spending by the judicial candidates to the money spent by outside 
groups on advertising in the races. Relying on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Caperton,53 we set out to assess which groups, if any, may have had a “dis-
proportionate influence” on the elections in either state. 
To develop this analysis, we are interested in the number of issue ads 
related to the judicial elections in each state, the number of those ads that 
mention a candidate in the judicial election, whether those mentions are re-
lated to a positive endorsement or negative attack, and the total spending 
amount. 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Jeff Wiltse, The Origins of Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act: A More Complete 
History, 73 MONT. L. REV. (2013) (containing a history of the Montana Corrupt Practices 
Act). 
 51. Terry & Bard, supra note 21. 
 52. Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices Tend to Favor Attorney Donors, supra note 22. 
 53. “The inquiry, centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total 
amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the 
apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.” Caperton v. A.T. Mas-
sey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009). 
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On the surface, Wisconsin and Arkansas might appear to be an odd 
combination of states for a comparison study of judicial advertising. With 
our previous research geographically tied both to our archive and our physi-
cal location, we assumed the difference in the states would provide an inter-
esting contrast as an empirical test. Surprisingly, the states actually had 
more in common than we had initially anticipated. Before 2016, both 
Arkansas and Wisconsin had experienced a blitz of issue ads in statewide 
judicial elections. Wisconsin’s experience with judicial race issue ads start-
ed shortly after the Citizens United decision with a race in 2011.54 Arkan-
sas’s first taste came in the 2014 judicial election, where an outside adver-
tiser, The Law Enforcement Alliance of America, ran a large quantity of 
attack issue ads in the Wynne-Cullen election.55 
A complete list of commercial television broadcast stations was assem-
bled for each state, and then the FCC’s online public file database was 
searched by call letter for each station. Inside of the public file of each sta-
tion, the political tabs for 2015 and 2016 were examined. Data on advertis-
ing by the official campaign of the candidates in each state as well as the 
advertising by outside groups in the judicial campaign was collected and 
coded. 
V. RESULTS 
There was a large volume of issue advertising in both states leading up 
to the statewide spring elections. In Arkansas, we identified a total of 2,627 
television ads that were run related to the 2016 statewide judicial election, 
representing a total spending of $1,069,369. Of these totals, issue advertis-
ing represented 1,386 spots, which was 52.8 percent of the total volume, and 
$585,268, which was 54.4 percent of the total spent. Notably, while outside 
advertising exceeded the spending of all of the official candidates combined, 
our data demonstrated only one issue advertiser that was active in the elec-
tion cycle, the Judicial Crisis Network, an advocacy group based in Wash-
ington, D.C. that was supporting Dan Kemp. 
In Wisconsin, we saw another active cycle of issue advertising related 
to a statewide judicial race. In total, 9,725 advertisements were run, repre-
senting $2,454,164.65 in spending. Issue advertising represented 4,004 of 
the spots, making up 41 percent of the total volume, and totaled $1,685,370, 
which was 68 percent of the total amount spent on the race. In Wisconsin, 
two advertisers bought issue ads. The Wisconsin Alliance for Reform organ-
ization ran 3,339 advertisements, which made up 83 percent of all issue ad-
 
 54. See Milwaukee Radio, supra note 19. 
 55. See Eugene Kiely, Mudslinging in Arkansas Judicial Race, FACTCHECK.ORG (May 
15, 2014), http://www.factcheck.org/2014/05/mudslinging-in-arkansas-judicial-race/. 
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verting in the race and 34 percent of all of the advertisements related to the 
election, and the group spent $1,326,220.65, which made up 78 percent of 
issue ad spending and 54 percent of total spending in the race; all to support 
the conservative incumbent, Rebecca Bradley. The Greater Wisconsin 
Committee ran 665 ads, which was 17 percent of issue advertising and 7 
percent of all election-related advertising, spending $359,150, which was 22 
percent of issue ad spending, and 14 percent of all spending in the race, 
which supported the challenger, Joanne Kloppenburg. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Ultimately, the center of our research is based on the contention that 
courts should look at the empirical evidence of changes in issue advertising 
when considering the balance between free speech and regulating political 
contributions. On this point, there can no longer be any debate that the Citi-
zens United decision has radically altered the landscape for political adver-
tising. While we remain skeptical of the outcomes of the decision as they 
relate to political races, the current research we have completed has given us 
significant concerns about the future of an impartial justice system. 
Wisconsin and Arkansas are, in many ways, very different states. They 
sit in different regions of the country, with different economic standing and 
industries, and have different population demographics. Wisconsin has near-
ly double the number of residents of Arkansas. Despite the differences be-
tween the states, our data demonstrates that the states share some common 
post-Citizens United outcomes in election-related spending on statewide 
judicial races in 2016. In Arkansas, the last two state supreme court races 
have been dominated by just one group purchasing issue ads. As a result, a 
well-funded, but otherwise apparently unconnected, group from outside of 
the state bought and ran a large quantity of attack ads in order to influence 
the race. With limited local ties, questions should be asked about the actual 
interests represented by an issue group like the Judicial Crisis Network, 
based in Washington, D.C., that outspent and ran more advertisements than 
all of the candidates combined. 
Likewise, in Wisconsin, where issue groups have been fighting an on-
air advertising war over judicial elections since 2011, and have outspent the 
candidates by substantial margins in each of the statewide judicial elections 
since Citizens United, questions linger about the intents of the various or-
ganizations spending large sums of money. Presumably, the goal is to influ-
ence policy in the state. While the diversity of the groups in Wisconsin run-
ning the issue advertising has been reduced, the message has not changed. 
Like Arkansas, none of the judicial election advertising we examined was in 
the form of positive support for a candidate. Almost universally, the issue 
advertising comprises attack ads. Negative ads have become a form of judi-
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cial-election currency since Citizens United, and that currency is being in-
vested with increasing frequency. 
While conservative-leaning judicial candidates appear to be benefiting 
the most from issue advertising, there seems to be another underlying 
thread. According to our dataset, none of the groups identified in this 2016 
election study were running ads that attacked candidates on their perceived 
judicial stances on contemporary or controversial social issues. In fact, a key 
element of ads attacking Courtney Goodson in Arkansas was her opposition 
to, and decision to overturn, the state’s tort reform law. While we have not 
empirically shown why this issue was featured by the advertisers, our re-
search has found media reporting that suggests the groups supporting con-
servative candidates in both statewide judicial elections are drawing finan-
cial resources from a common network of donors.56 In fact, in both states, 
the groups running the advertising appear to be funded primarily by industry 
groups, which then use the issue groups as “fronts” to control the discus-
sions about the candidates.57 This tactic has been performed openly by pro-
industry groups in Wisconsin in earlier judicial elections. In 2016, just one 
group, which had not run a single advertisement before this election, was 
running attack ads against the more liberal candidate Kloppenburg, support-
ing the incumbent Bradley who was perceived to be more pro-business.58 
Logically, a $500,000 covert investment in a judicial election could be 
money well spent by an industry if a favorable candidate is put on, or re-
mains on, the bench before a potentially high-dollar liability or expensive 
regulation case is going to be heard. In both states, as the issue groups run 
more ads and far outspend the actual candidates, it provides an opportunity 
to apply Justice Kennedy’s inquiry from Caperton. Problematically, as the 
issue advertising is being conducted by outside groups on behalf of indus-
tries or individuals, there is limited disclosure of the actual parties trying to 
influence races. As a result, there is virtually no way to ascertain the actual 
source of the political speech or the intent of the speaker in the issue ads. 
The absence of meaningful accountability logically creates a near-perfect 
environment for potential corruption. 
 
 56. Peter Overby, Viveca Novak & Robert Maguire, Secret Persuasion: How Big Cam-
paign Donors Stay Anonymous, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: MORNING EDITION (Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/06/243022966/secret-persuasion-how-big-campaign-donors-
stay-anonymous. 
 57. Peter Overby, Viveca Novak & Robert Maguire, Wellspring’s Flow: Dark Money 
Outfit Helped Fuel Groups on Political Front Lines, NAT’L PUB. RADIO: MORNING EDITION 
(Nov. 5, 2013). https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/11/wellsprings-flow/. 
 58. Molly Beck, With Rebecca Bradley, Conservatives Increase Their Majority on the 
Supreme Court, WIS. ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-
politics/with-rebecca-bradley-conservatives-increase-their-majority-on-the-
supreme/article_1a51d9bd-430b-587d-ac39-42228cdb66c5.html. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The data examined in this study empirically establishes a set pattern for 
the 2016 judicial races in Arkansas and Wisconsin. In both cases, the over-
whelming majority of advertisements and money spent on advertising came 
from a very small group of outside groups rather than the campaigns them-
selves. Further, knowledge of the identity of the parties funding the advertis-
ing is limited, as is their motives. While we cannot empirically say why the 
groups opted to expend hundreds of thousands of dollars on state judicial 
races, we can say that a rational actor would do so only if that actor ex-
pected some kind of return on that investment. With one or two groups seek-
ing to play an outsize role in placing or keeping a judge in a position to posi-
tively rule in the groups’ favor, it seems that the situations in Arkansas and 
Wisconsin have edged close to, if not firmly within, Justice Kennedy’s 
“probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker” that 
“is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”59 
The impartiality of the nation’s judges lies at the heart of our legal sys-
tem and our democracy. The data in this study indicates that this impartiality 
is under threat by the kind of unlimited issue advertising legalized by Citi-
zens United. At the very least in the arena of judicial elections, the Court 
should use empirical research to calibrate its balance between free speech 
and the regulation of political advertising so that it is clear that no group can 
buy the allegiance of a judge. 
 
 59. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 877 (2009) (quoting Win-
throp v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
